Crouching Monkey, Wounded Tiger Pt. I

"It is as sudden as death. The only thing different is that you do not have to walk into a funeral home, peek into the box and say, 'Well, he was a nice guy'.
"It is like the phases of death. You have loss, anger, sadness, and then you come to accept it."

Brownlee, Jason. "Ruling Parties and Regime Persistence: Durable Electoral Authoritarianism in Egypt and Malaysia" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper demonstrates why electoral authoritarian systems benefit from party institutions that prevent leadership rifts by accommodating dissent and managing elite interests. I present Egypt and Malaysia’s experiences with ruling parties and regime persistence, the contrast outcome to incumbent defeat. By regulating leadership politics, the NDP in Egypt and UMNO in Malaysia have held together a dominant cadre and repeatedly blocked opposition forces from winning control of government.

Barclay, Pascael. "Do Authoritarian Elections Matter? Political Business Cycles in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Mar 26, 2008

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Do elections in authoritarian regimes matter? It is often assumed that they are mere window dressing. Yet it is also possible that these elections have independent effects, which make authoritarian leaders care about the elections, despite their ability to manipulate the results through fraud and repression. One way to discover whether authoritarian elections matter is to examine political business cycles (PBCs) in electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes. This study shows that PBCs occur cross-nationally in authoritarian regimes that hold regular elections, but only when the incumbent faces a challenger. In fact, government consumption increases by .43% in election years in competitive elections. Although this number is small, elections have the largest impact on government spending of the variables included in the model. Also, evidence from case studies portray PBCs in authoritarian regimes as targeted and informal. Therefore, in the case of informal spending, much pre-electoral spending may not be captured by overall government consumption or, in the case of targeted spending, the magnitude of the increase for certain groups will similarly not be captured by this aggregate variable. From the evidence presented in this study, we can conclude that PBCs occur in competitive authoritarian settings, indicating that dictators care about electoral returns.

Thompson, Mark. and Kuntz, Philipp. "To Steal or not to Steal: Authoritarian Regime Behavior after Electoral Defeat" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The terrain that authoritarian regimes enter after electoral defeats has been roughly surveyed but not yet well mapped. We show that there are other outcomes than the two options of stealing an election and retaining office or accepting defeat and surrendering power. There is also the possibility of regimes stealing elections but losing power after failing to effectively repress popular protest. In other cases, non-democratic rulers have accepted defeat but still maintained ultimate political power. We then offer a few explanations for these different paths. We coin the term “electoral sultanism” to stress the importance of personalistic interests in explaining electoral theft. Parallel to this was the argument that regimes with stronger institutional interests are more likely to concede that the opposition has won because regime members are better able to defend vital interests outside of power. Whether regimes hold onto power after accepting defeat depends basically upon the scope of the election. Conceding defeat in polls that are constitutionally limited because they are local, or only referenda, or constrained in their impact due to “dual power” in the state does not lead to the loss of power and can even contribute to authoritarian consolidation. Only conceding defeat in national elections for the highest office makes a withdrawal from power inevitable. Limited polls have been stolen nonetheless because autocrats estimated the costs in acknowledging defeat - a loss of reputation or the creation of “oppositional islands” - as too high.